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THE DEBATE OVER THE PERMISSIBILITY
OF SELECTIVE PRIVILEGE WAIVER
ORDERS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF




In the past, most common-law courts developed an intense antipathy to
privileges because they perceived privileges as obstructing the search for
truth. To begin with, the courts made it difficult for claimants to assert
privileges by prescribing rigorous foundational requirements for privilege
claims. Moreover, the courts made it easy to find a waiver. As some com-
mentators observed, many courts took an absolutist approach and de-
manded that holders guard their privileges like crown jewels. For example,
the courts announced that even inadvertent production of privileged mate-
rial could effect a waiver, a waiver as to any privileged communication
automatically extends to any other privileged communication on the same
subject matter, and holder may not make a selective waiver as to some third
parties but not others.
The rub was that in the era of the pretrial discovery of electronically
stored information, these waiver rules imposed inordinate economic costs.
Modernly, pretrial discovery can entail millions of pages of documents.
Given these waiver rules, the only way to avoid waiver was to conduct a
time-consuming, comprehensive preproduction privilege review. In some
cases, the cost of the review could easily exceed the monetary stakes in the
litigation. The problem became so acute that Congress intervened, enacting
Federal Rule of Evidence 502. Rule 502(b) repudiates the rule that inadver-
tent production necessarily results in a waiver, and Rule 502(a) similarly
rejects the automatic subject matter waiver rule.
One of the early drafts of Rule 502 contained a provision authorizing
selective waivers, but that provision was withdrawn from the final draft that
Congress voted on and approved. That legislative history has led many
courts and commentators to conclude that a court may not authorize a
selective waiver under Rule 502. On closer examination, though, that con-
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clusion is only partially true. In any given case, the key is paying attention
to the scope issues: the scope of Rule 502 and the scope of the selective
waiver agreement between the parties.
On the one hand, assume that the parties ask the court to approve a
narrow selective waiver agreement providing only that the holder’s disclo-
sure of privileged information to the other party in the proceeding will not
effect a waiver. Rule 502 governs only one type of waiver, namely, waivers
effected by disclosure. On this assumption, though, the scope of the agree-
ment coincides with the scope of Rule 502; a court order under Rule 502(d)
would validate the agreement. If the parties reached a settlement after the
disclosure and during the proceeding the holder performed no other act
that would effect a waiver, by the terms of Rule 502(d), the holder would
still be able to assert the privilege in subsequent litigation against third
parties.
On the other hand, assume alternatively that the parties enter into a
broader selective waiver agreement that purports to provide that without
waiving, the holder may not only disclose but also allow the other party to
the agreement to introduce evidence of the privileged communication at an
adversary hearing in this proceeding. This agreement exceeds the scope of
Rule 502; Rule 502 does not apply to waivers effected by the failure to
object to the introduction of testimony about privileged communications. If
the holder failed to object to the use of the evidence in the prior proceeding,
Rule 502 would not preclude finding a waiver in subsequent litigation with
third parties. Indeed, there is a grave risk that merely by consenting to that
use of the privileged communication in the broader selective waiver agree-
ment, the holder has lost the privilege.
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I. INTRODUCTION
PRIVILEGE law differs fundamentally from the typical doctrinesgoverning the admissibility of evidence. Most evidentiary doctrinesrest on the judicial system’s institutional concerns about the accu-
racy of factfinding, such as whether the trier of fact will use the item of
evidence only as proof of the fact that the item is admitted to establish
and whether the trier will assign the item appropriate probative weight.1
In contrast, privilege rules are based on considerations of extrinsic social
policy. As former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg remarked
during the 1973 Congressional hearings on the then-proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, privilege law “is the concern of the public at large.”2
In the final House report on the Rules, Representative Elizabeth Holtz-
man asserted that “unlike most evidentiary rules, privileges protect inter-
personal relationships outside of the courtroom.”3
However, precisely because privileges do not reflect the judicial sys-
tem’s institutional concerns, there is a tension between those concerns
and privilege doctrine. In the microcosm of a given case, the invocation of
a privilege such as the attorney-client privilege to exclude relevant evi-
dence can frustrate the objective of accurate factfinding and cause a
wrongful verdict. For that reason, the great English utilitarian philoso-
pher Jeremy Bentham sharply attacked most privileges. Bentham be-
lieved that the first and foremost objective of the judicial system was to
accurately ascertain the truth.4 While he supported a Crown Secrets doc-
trine and felt that the principle of religious tolerance required the recog-
1. FED. R. EVID. 105, 403.
2. Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Crim. Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 143 (1973) (statement of
Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 28 (1973).
4. See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY AP-
PLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 1 (1827) (stating his theory that “merely with a view to recti-
tude of decision, to the avoidance of the mischiefs attached to undue decision, no species
of evidence whatsoever . . . ought to be excluded”).
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nition of a privilege for required confessions,5 he was adamantly opposed
to other privileges. For instance, he vigorously attacked the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. He reasoned that if the attorney’s client was innocent “by
the supposition there is nothing to betray: let the law adviser say every
thing he has heard from his client, the client cannot have any thing to
fear.”6 Bentham’s powerful rhetorical attacks, though, had little impact in
the legislature or the courts. Parliament did not curtail privileges, and the
English courts continued to recognize privileges such as the one protect-
ing the attorney-client relationship.7 Like Bentham, Dean Henry Wig-
more, a giant in American law, believed that the judicial system should
assign the highest priority to rectitude of decision. Again, like Bentham,
he was skeptical of the value of privileges. In his mind, privileges were
often obstructions in the search for truth. He wrote forcefully that “[t]he
investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty demand
the restriction, not the expansion, of . . . privileges. They should be recog-
nized only within the narrowest limits . . . . Every step beyond these limits
helps to provide . . . an obstacle to the administration of justice.”8
In order to confine privileges to “the narrowest limits,” Wigmore pro-
posed a strict set of criteria for recognizing privileges—his famous four
instrumental criteria.9 One criterion was that “confidentiality must be es-
sential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.”10 The third criterion was, in effect, Wigmore’s means of rec-
onciling the recognition of a privilege with the priority of rectitude of
decision.11 For example, if confidentiality is truly essential to maintaining
an attorney-client relationship, without an assurance of confidentiality,
the client would be unwilling to consult and confide in the attorney.12 In
Jaffee v. Redmond,13 the landmark Supreme Court decision recognizing a
psychotherapist privilege, Justice Stevens voiced that view about the need
for confidentiality in the psychotherapist-patient relationship: “[t]his un-
spoken ‘evidence’ [would] . . . serve no greater truth-seeking function
than if it had been spoken and privileged.”14 In Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed a similar belief about the
5. 5 BENTHAM, supra note 4, at 346.
6. Id. at 304.
7. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PRO., U.S. JUD. CONF., RULES OF EVIDENCE: A
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 43 (Comm. Print 1962),
reprinted in 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962).
8. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 73
(John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
9. Id. § 2285, at 527.
10. See id. (emphasis omitted).
11. Id.
12. Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 31, 31 (2000) (“In a perfect [Wigmorean] world, however, the privilege would
shield no evidence. Privilege generates the communication that the privilege protects.
Eliminate the privilege, and the communication disappears . . . . [T]he privilege would
protect only . . . statements that would not otherwise have been made.”).
13. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
14. Id. at 12.
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invocation of the attorney-client privilege to exclude relevant communi-
cations, stating: “[T]he loss of evidence is more apparent than real.”15
The rub is that in many, if not most, cases the loss is indeed real; the
behavioral assumptions underlying “the establishment line” lack empiri-
cal support.16 There have been numerous studies of both the attorney-
client and psychotherapist-patient privileges.17 For the most part, the
studies undercut the facile generalization that the typical layperson con-
sulting an attorney or therapist is so fearful of subsequent, judicially com-
pelled disclosure of his or her statements that they would not consult with
or confide in the professional without the assurance of confidentiality fur-
nished by a formal privilege.18 To be sure, in some cases the layperson
would balk at disclosure. Moreover, in many cases the layperson would
undoubtedly be more circumspect in written communication with the
professional. However, when a troubled layperson seeks out an attorney,
therapist, or doctor, the layperson is frequently more focused on the
“here and now,” the current problem demanding immediate attention,
rather than the long-term risk of disclosure in a lawsuit that may be filed
in the distant future or that might never be filed.19
Given the priority on accurate factfinding and the justifiable fear that
enforcing a privilege often results in the suppression of valuable evidence,
it was predictable that many courts would adopt a hostile attitude toward
privileges—an attitude reflecting Bentham and Wigmore’s own antipathy.
The cases are legion proclaiming that privileges are not favored and that
they must be narrowly, strictly construed.20 That hostile attitude
manifests itself in several ways. To begin with, the courts tend to demand
that a privilege claimant meet a high standard of proof to establish a
prima facie case for a privilege claim. If the claimant’s foundational proof
is ambiguous, the courts resolve the ambiguity against the claimant and
deny the privilege claim.21 Moreover, even when the claimant has a solid
prima facie case for privilege, the courts recognize a large number of acts
that can result in a waiver of the privilege.22 These courts have adopted
15. 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998).
16. Richard Lempert, Comment, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common
Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619, 1688 (2001); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Ques-
tioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evi-
dentiary Privileges, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 145 (2004).
17. See 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
§ 5.2.2, at 369 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 3d ed. 2016).
18. Id. § 5.2.2(d), at 391.
19. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Court Ducks Larger Privilege Issues Yet Again, NAT’L
L.J., July 20, 1998, at A22.
20. See Taylor Lohmeyer L. Firm P.L.L.C. v. United States, 957 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir.
2020); Advanced Physicians, S.C. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 431 F. Supp. 3d 857, 861
(N.D. Tex. 2020); United States v. Carter, 429 F. Supp. 3d 788, 881 (D. Kan. 2019), vacated
in part on other grounds, No. 16-20032-02-JAR, 2020 WL 430739 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2020); 1
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 4.2.4(c), at 317 n.593 (collecting cases).
21. Taylor Lohmeyer L. Firm P.L.L.C., 957 F.3d at 510.
22. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(a)(2).
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an absolutist,23 “all-or-nothing”24 approach to privilege waiver. The
holder must guard his or her privilege like a crown jewel, and if for virtu-
ally any reason they disclose some of the privileged information to any-
one outside the original circle of confidence, the holder permanently
forfeits the privilege as against all third parties. A case in point is the
current controversy over the question of whether under Federal Rule of
Evidence 502(d), a court may permit the holder to make a selective
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in a federal proceeding.25 Prior to
Congress’s enactment of Rule 502 in 2008, the federal and state courts
were badly divided over the question of selective waiver.26 Of course, a
selective waiver agreement could involve only private parties, but the is-
sue often arose in this context: In a government investigation into corpo-
rate misconduct, in order to dissuade the government from prosecuting,
the corporation would share the results of a privileged internal investiga-
tion into the misconduct with the government, and later private litigants
suing the corporation would seek to discover the same material on the
theory that the holder’s disclosure to the government waived the privi-
lege. In this setting, a minority of courts refused to find a waiver, at least
if the government and corporation had entered into an agreement in
which the corporation expressly reserved the privilege. However, the
clear majority of courts rejected the notion of a selective waiver.27 They
reasoned that once the corporation had disclosed the privileged material
23. Liesa L. Richter, Corporation Salvation or Damnation? Proposed New Federal
Rule Legislation on Selective Waiver, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2007) (“[J]udicial
rejection of selective waiver ignores the evolution of privilege doctrine from a paradigm of
rigid absolutism to one of fairness and flexible party autonomy over protected
information.”).
24. United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 1995).
25. To be sure, there are other controversies related to Rule 502(d). One question is
whether a Rule 502(d) order can completely relieve a party of the obligation to take rea-
sonable steps to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. See Michael
Correll, The Troubling Ambition of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), 77 MO. L. REV. 1031,
1058–67 (2012) (explaining the various approaches courts have taken to interpret Rule
502(d)); FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (“[T]he court order may provide
for return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing
party.”). Another controversy is whether the judge must find “good cause” before entering
a Rule 502(d) order over a party’s objection. Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses Drink: Con-
ceptual Change Theory and Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1687
(2013) (citing Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582
(D. Kan. July 22, 2010)). As Professor Richter points out, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure ordinarily require that the judge find good cause before entering a protective order.
Richter, supra, at 1687. However, the selective waiver controversy provides the most fun-
damental insight into the courts’ attitude toward the waiver doctrine. Id.
26. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(a)(2), at 1187–1201.
27. See, e.g., Patrick v. City of Chicago, 154 F. Supp. 3d 705, 711 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(“‘[S]elective disclosure is not an option.’ ‘The client cannot be permitted to pick and
choose among his opponents. . . .’” (first quoting Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897,
899 (7th Cir. 2003); then quoting In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Pracs.
Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302–03 (6th Cir. 2002))); Amy Conway-Hatcher, Kyle Clark & An-
drew George, Protecting the Privilege in Corporate Investigations When It Counts—From
the Beginning, 86 U.S.L.W. (BL) 937 (Jan. 11, 2018) (“Many courts have rejected the doc-
trine of ‘selective waiver.’”).
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to any third party outside the original circle of confidence, the privilege
was lost forever.
In 2008, Congress enacted Federal Rule 502. In pertinent part, Rule
502 reads:
The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to dis-
closure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-
client privilege or work-product protection.
(a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office
or Agency; Scope of a Waiver. When the disclosure is made in a fed-
eral proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attor-
ney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends
to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state
proceeding only if:
(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information
concern the same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.
(b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or
to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a
waiver in a federal or state proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege . . . took reasonable steps to prevent
disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error . . . .
. . . .
(d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. A federal court may order
that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected
with the litigation pending before the court—in which event the dis-
closure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.28
Admittedly, Congress did not intervene to enact Rule 502 for the
stated purpose of resolving the controversy over selective waivers.
Rather, Congress intervened primarily to address the spiraling cost of
pretrial discovery, driven in part by numerous judicial holdings that even
an inadvertent production of a single privileged document during discov-
ery resulted in a subject matter waiver, extending to every other privi-
leged document relevant to the same subject. In these holdings, the courts
manifested their hostility to privileges by visiting harsh consequences on
any privilege holder who inadvertently produced even a solitary privi-
leged document in a case involving millions of pages of electronically
stored information. In order to avoid such waivers, litigants felt com-
pelled to conduct extensive, expensive preproduction privilege reviews of
material requested by the opposition. At a public hearing on the subject,
“[r]epresentatives from Verizon testified . . . that the company had spent
$13.5 million on one privilege review relating to a U.S. Department of
28. FED. R. EVID. 502(a)–(b), (d).
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Justice antitrust merger investigation.”29 In one survey, federal litigants
indicated that the cost of preproduction privilege reviews had skyrock-
eted and often accounted for 30%–50% of the total cost of litigation.30
The stark reality was that litigants’ fear that an inadvertent production
would effect a subject matter waiver had become so acute that the cost of
a preproduction privilege review could exceed the monetary stakes in the
litigation.31 New Rules 502(a) and (b) directly addressed this problem.
Rule 502(b) rejected the categorical rule that an inadvertent disclosure of
privileged material is a waiver, and for its part, Rule 502(a) added that
even if there was a waiver, an inadvertent disclosure does not trigger a
broad, subject matter waiver.32 However, the controversy over selective
waiver also surfaced during the deliberations over Rule 502. As we shall
see in Part III of this Article, an early draft of the Rule included a provi-
sion authorizing selective waiver.33 However, that language was deleted
before Congress’s final approval of the Rule.34 On its face, the wording of
Rule 502(d) is arguably expansive enough to allow a judge to enter an
order authorizing a selective waiver, and the language does not explicitly
prohibit a judge from doing so. However, in the House report on the
Rule, one representative stated that Rule 502(d) “does not provide a ba-
sis for a court to enable parties to agree to a selective waiver of the privi-
lege, such as to a federal agency conducting an investigation, while
preserving the privilege as against other parties seeking the informa-
tion.”35 Nevertheless, some commentators insist that the courts should
respect the plain meaning of Rule 502(d)’s text and give effect to court
orders allowing selective waivers, at least when the holder is interacting
with a government enforcement or regulatory agency.36
The thesis of this short Article is that the continuing controversy over
the validity of Rule 502(d) selective waiver orders is a product of two
scope problems: the first a failure to define the scope of selective waiver
and the second a failure to pay attention to the limited scope of Rule 502.
Part II of this Article describes the pre-Rule 502 split of authority over
29. Alvin F. Lindsay, New Rule 502 to Protect Against Privilege Waiver, NAT’L L.J.,
Aug. 25, 2008, at S2.
30. Thomas Brom, e-Discovery Options, CAL. LAW., Jan. 2009, at 14.
31. Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005) (“[E]lectronic
document discovery may encompass . . . millions[ ] of [documents, and] . . . to insist in
every case upon . . . record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of subject
matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that bear no proportionality
to what is at stake in the litigation.”), aff’d, 598 F. App’x 860 (4th Cir. 2015).
32. FED. R. EVID. 502(a), (b).
33. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(a)(2), at 1193 (“[T]he [original] draft
read that there is no waiver if ‘the disclosure is made to a federal, state, or local govern-
mental agency during an investigation by that agency, and is limited to persons involved in
the investigation.’”).
34. Id.
35. 154 CONG. REC. H7817, 7818–19 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jack-
son-Lee).
36. See Keyawna Griffith, Note, From Compulsion to Compensation: How Selective
Waiver Compensates Corporations for Involuntary Disclosures, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41
(2019).
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the validity of selective waivers. Part III is also descriptive. Section III.A
chronicles the general history of Rule 502. Section III.B focuses on the
specific dispute over the propriety of selective waiver orders under Rule
502(d). In contrast, Part IV is evaluative, reaching the merits of the dis-
pute described in Section III.B. Part IV demonstrates that the keys to
resolving the controversy are precisely defining the scope of the selective
waiver in question and respecting Rule 502’s limited scope, governing
only waivers effected by disclosure—as opposed to other conduct—by
the holder. Once those two scopes are defined and understood, the reso-
lution of the dispute becomes a relatively straightforward matter. The ul-
timate denouement is that, depending on the scope of the proposed
selective waiver, in some cases a Rule 502(d) order may certainly author-
ize a selective waiver while in other cases such an order would be patently
invalid. Implicit antipathy to privileges, which strains waiver doctrines to
defeat privilege claims, might prompt a court to rule that all such orders
are invalid, but a principled analysis of the issue leads to a very different
conclusion.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER
SELECTIVE WAIVER
Courts and commentators often—if not usually—refer to selective
waiver in the singular as if there were only one type of selective waiver
agreement. However, on closer scrutiny, as we shall soon see, it becomes
evident that there are several conceivable types of selective waivers. Nev-
ertheless, there is a core concept of selective waiver. At its core, the con-
cept of selective waiver has two foci: one on a privilege holder’s current
dealings with another party, such as the government, in a dispute or in-
vestigation and a second on the holder’s intent to otherwise retain the
privilege and therefore the ability to later assert the privilege against
third parties. The first focus is on the holder’s present discussion with a
party, such as law enforcement agents or government regulators con-
ducting an investigation. The most essential entitlement in a holder’s bun-
dle of rights is the right to refuse to disclose the information to anyone
outside the original circle of confidentiality.37 For instance, if in the
course of a lawful investigation a government agency served the holder
with a subpoena calling for the disclosure of material covered by the at-
torney-client privilege, the holder may invoke the privilege as a basis for
refusing to comply with the subpoena. However, in order to obtain
favorable treatment from the government agency, the holder might enter
into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).38 Pursuant to the agree-
37. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.6.1(a). For example, California Evidence
Code § 954 defines the attorney-client privilege as the right “to refuse to disclose.” CAL.
EVID. CODE § 953 (West 2020).
38. See Andrea Amulic, Note, Humanizing the Corporation While Dehumanizing the
Individual: The Misuse of Deferred-Prosecution Agreements in the United States, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2017); see also Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Cor-
porate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 323 (2008).
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ment, the holder could consent to disclose the privileged information to
the agents or regulators in the current discussions. Under the terms of the
agreement, the holder might voluntarily disclose the information to the
government—an act that would ordinarily result in a waiver of the privi-
lege. However, at the time of that disclosure in its dealings with the gov-
ernment, the holder has a second focus in mind; despite the disclosure to
the government, the holder intends to retain the right to later assert the
privilege to refuse to disclose to third parties. Thus, the DPA might ex-
pressly provide that the holder does not intend to waive the privilege
against any private litigants who might subsequently sue the holder.39
The question arose whether the courts should respect the holder’s in-
tent and allow the holder to later invoke the privilege against third par-
ties. There is extensive scholarly support for the notion of selective
waiver.40 The scholarly articles outline an especially plausible policy case
for recognizing the concept, at least when the initial focus is an interac-
tion between the holder and a government agency investigating a corpo-
rate holder’s potential misconduct. Government enforcement and
regulatory agencies have limited financial and time resources.41 One of
the primary challenges facing the criminal justice system is the limited
funding of white collar enforcement units.42 Although it is often a useful
fiction to treat an entity as a person, section 9.28.210 of the United States
Attorney’s Manual points out that the government’s real world priority is
the prosecution and deterrence of the natural persons who actually per-
petrate the misconduct. As that section declares, “imposition of individ-
ual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future
corporate wrongdoing.”43 If the government can “piggy-back”44 on a cor-
poration’s internal investigation of corporate wrongdoing, the govern-
ment can conserve resources that can then be devoted to the investigation
of other serious crimes. However, a corporation’s fear that the revelation
of the privileged material could expose it to substantial monetary liability
in subsequent litigation can be a major disincentive to the corporation’s
cooperation with the government. In the long term, by removing that dis-
incentive, the recognition of selective waiver can promote the administra-
39. Thomas Brom, Read My Lips, CAL. LAW., Apr. 2006, at 17 (“[T]he Delaware state
court recognized selective waiver if there is a confidentiality agreement with the
government.”).
40. See Richter, supra note 23; Sean L. Finan, Comment, Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten
Manufacturing Corp.: Is Waiver an All-or-Nothing Proposition or Does Policy Favor a
More Limited Approach?, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 589, 604 (2004).
41. See Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the
Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1125, 1228 (2006) (“Corporations conduct internal investigations that cost
millions of dollars, investigations that ‘[f]ederal prosecutors don’t have funds for . . . and
would be unable to replicate . . . .’” (alterations in original)).
42. See Richman, supra note 38, at 320; see also Andrew Gilman, Note, The Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act: The Prospect of Congressional Intervention into the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policy, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1136 (2008).
43. U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’ys’ Manual § 9.28.210 (2018).
44. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 41, at 1228.
2020] Crucial Scope Issues 789
tion of the laws that the government agents are tasked with enforcing. In
other words, by protecting the holder’s private interest in retaining its
privilege, a selective waiver can advance the public interest. The social
utility of selective waiver agreements between private parties may be de-
batable, but when the holder and a government agency contemplate en-
tering into such an agreement, the agreement implicates and serves a
special public interest.45
Given that policy argument, a number of legislatures and courts have
embraced the concept of selective waiver. In 2006, Congress amended the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the Federal Credit Union Act to ex-
pressly authorize waiver under those regulatory schemes.46 For instance,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act now provides:
The submission by any person of any information to . . . any Federal
banking agency, State bank supervisor, or foreign banking authority
for any purpose in the course of any supervisory or regulatory pro-
cess of such . . . agency, supervisor, or authority, shall not be con-
strued as waiving, destroying, or otherwise affecting any privilege
such person may claim with respect to such information under Fed-
eral or State law as to any person or entity other than such . . .
agency, supervisor, or authority.47
Likewise, the Oklahoma Rules of Evidence provide:
Disclosure of a communication or information meeting the require-
ments of an attorney-client privilege . . . to a governmental office,
agency or political subdivision in the exercise of its regulatory, inves-
tigative, or enforcement authority does not operate as a waiver of
the privilege . . . in favor of nongovernmental persons or entities.48
Moreover, the concept of selective waiver has garnered the support of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and several
district courts.49 The leading precedent is the Eighth Circuit’s 1977 deci-
sion in Diversified Industries v. Meredith.50 For that matter, in Bentham’s
45. Enron Corp. v. Borget, No. 88 Civ. 2828, 1990 WL 144879, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 1990) (“[T]he public policy concern of encouraging cooperation with law enforcement
militates in favor of a no waiver finding.”).
46. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 607(a),
(b), 120 Stat. 1982 (2006) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1785(j), 1828(x)(1)).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x)(1); see also Audrey Strauss, White Collar Crime; Selective Priv-
ilege Waiver for the Banking Industry; Corporate Update, 237 N.Y. L.J. 29 (2007).
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2502(F) (West, Westlaw through 57th Leg., 2d Leg. Sess.
(2020)).
49. Gilman, supra note 42, at 1088.
50. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). Some have suggested that the United States Supreme
Court implicitly approved of the concept of selective waiver in Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981). Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Con-
fidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 884 (1998). However, later Professor
Rice emphasized that the Court did not explicitly endorse the concept. He noted that the
Court clearly wanted to reach the “hot button” question of whether corporate employees
personify the corporation for purposes of communicating with corporate counsel. Profes-
sor Rice elaborated: “An equally plausible interpretation . . . is that the court felt it more
important to resolve the question of who personifies the corporate client than to address
the concept of limited waiver which, if rejected, would have made the personification dis-
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home country, the English courts have moved beyond his fierce hostility
to privileges and validated the concept of selective waiver.51
Although the concept of selective waiver enjoys respectable legislative
and judicial support and rests on a plausible policy argument, the vast
majority of American courts have repudiated the concept.52 In some
cases, these courts have challenged the policy argument underlying the
concept and have asserted that the recognition of the concept is unneces-
sary to assure a corporate holder’s cooperation with the government.53
That generalization may be true in many cases, but the assertion is cer-
tainly dubious when, under the substantive criminal law, the corporation
faces a modest fine but its civil liability exposure in subsequent private
litigation is potentially massive. In many cases, though, rather than at-
tacking the policy argument favoring selective waivers, the courts are
content to voice the traditional antipathy towards privileges; in effect,
courts rely on the proposition that if the holder makes any disclosure of
privileged information “outside [the] magic circle,” the privilege is per-
manently lost.54 In one oft-cited case, Permian Corp. v. United States, the
court declared that privilege law cannot allow holders “to pick and
choose among . . . opponents.”55 Some courts stop short of altogether
rejecting the concept but insist that there should be “a strong presump-
tion against a finding of selective waiver.”56 The bottom line is that in
rejecting selective waiver, numerous courts fall back on a relatively in-
flexible all-or-nothing stance on waiver issues.57
In the above cases, and far more often than not, the courts address only
the validity of the general notion of selective waiver—as if there is only
one type of selective waiver. However, as stated at the outset of Part II,
there are several conceivable varieties of selective waiver agreements. In
cuss unnecessary.” PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 9:88, at 9-565 to -566 (2d ed. 2010).
51. Belhaj v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2018] EWHC (Admin) 513 [2] (Eng.) (“[The
producing party] provides these papers for the sole purpose of assisting with this [govern-
ment] investigation and do not consider to have waived legal privilege for any other pur-
pose, including any future prosecution or civil claim.”); Citic Pac. Ltd. v. Sec’y for Just.,
[2012] 4 H.K.C. 1, 15; Berezovsky v. Hine [2011] EWHC (Civ) 1089, [28]–[29] (Eng.).
52. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D. Mass. 2004)
(“[E]very Circuit but the Eighth that has addressed the issue has ruled that voluntary dis-
closures to the government in an enforcement context destroy the attorney-client privi-
lege.”); JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 5-47 to -48
(2d ed. 1990) (citing decisions from the District of Columbia, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits);
Conway-Hatcher et al., supra note 27, at 4 (“Many courts have rejected the doctrine of
‘selective waiver.’”); Jason Somensatto, What Companies Should Consider Before Waiving
Attorney-Client Privilege During a Government Investigation, 83 U.S.L.W. (BL) (March 31,
2015) (“[T]he doctrine is universally applied in only one circuit . . . .”); Rice, supra note 50
(“[M]ost lower courts have rejected the . . . concept . . . .”); David M. Zornow & Keith D.
Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Crimi-
nal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 153 n.31 (2000) (“[T]he case law in most
circuits provides little comfort that such selective waivers will be upheld.”).
53. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2006).
54. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1997).
55. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
57. Richter, supra note 23.
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the simplest, most common scenario, in its dealings with a party such as a
government agency, the holder consents to disclose privileged informa-
tion while simultaneously intending to retain the right to later refuse to
disclose to other third parties. However, on a moment’s reflection it be-
comes clear that in its initial dealings with a party such as a government
agency, it is theoretically possible for the holder to assert its autonomy by
agreeing to other conduct that would otherwise effect a waiver of the
privilege—conduct such as allowing the other party to publicly disclose
some of the information58 or even using the information as trial evi-
dence.59 Concededly, it would be unrealistic for a holder to agree to the
use of the information as trial evidence in a situation in which the holder
is facing a solitary charge in a single proceeding. However, if the holder
were involved in multiple proceedings or several charges, in exchange for
government concessions, the holder could plausibly consent to the use of
the information with respect to a certain charge or in a particular pro-
ceeding. Differentiating among these possible variations of selective
waiver agreements will become critical in Part IV because, again, by its
terms Rule 502 deals only with waivers effected by disclosure.
III. A DESCRIPTION OF THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 502, INCLUDING THE CONTROVERSY OVER
THE PERMISSIBILITY OF RULE 502(d) SELECTIVE
WAIVER ORDERS
A. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502 IN GENERAL
1. Congress’s Initial Consideration of the Draft Federal Rules
The Introduction noted that privilege law differs from the other areas
of evidence law, which is principally inspired by the judicial system’s insti-
tutional concerns about the accuracy of factfinding and the rectitude of
decision. The history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule
502, demonstrates that Congress shares the perception that privilege law
is special. In 1973, after the Judicial Conference had prepared a draft of
the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court transmitted the draft to Con-
gress.60 The draft included Article V, devoted to privileges. Article V
contained thirteen provisions: several general provisions, including one
on waiver (draft Rule 511), and a number of provisions devoted to spe-
cific privileges such as the psychotherapist privilege (draft Rule 504), hus-
band-wife privilege (draft Rule 505), and government information
privilege (draft Rule 509).61
When the Court had previously submitted the draft Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure to Congress, Congress allowed the Rules to
58. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(a)(4)–(5).
59. See id. § 6.12.4(c)(4).
60. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-46 (1973).
61. Id. at 9–19.
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take effect without making so much as a single change.62 However, Con-
gress reacted very differently when it received the draft Federal Rules of
Evidence. This time Congress’s response “was both swift and violent.”63
Congress immediately passed legislation blocking the promulgation of
the draft Evidence Rules.64 The submission of the draft Rules created a
furor65 and precipitated a “crisis” in the rulemaking process.66
The lightning rod for Congress was draft Article V on privileges. Con-
gress’s initial negative reaction to Article V almost doomed the entire
Federal Rules of Evidence project.67 The House report, justifying the leg-
islation blocking the promulgation of the draft Rules, stated that the
House Judiciary Committee had received numerous complaints about
“the formulation of the rules relating to doctor-patient and husband-wife
privileges, . . . and official information, . . . among others.”68 Draft Rule
504 set out a psychotherapist privilege but not a general medical privi-
lege.69 Draft Rule 505 purported to abolish the spousal communications
privilege while continuing to recognize an accused’s right to prevent his
or her spouse from testifying against the accused.70 Draft Rule 509 de-
scribed a broad privilege for government information.71 Representative
Bertram Podell was sharply critical of draft Article V for curtailing the
medical and spousal privileges.72 Draft Rule 509, expansively describing
government privilege, became a special target. The timing was terrible
because the Court submitted the draft to the same Congress that had
recently battled President Nixon in federal court over claims of govern-
ment privilege.73
After blocking the promulgation of the draft Rules, Congress spent two
years deliberating over the Rules.74 Much of the time was devoted to a
detailed critique of draft Article V. The Rules ultimately took the form of
statutes enacted by Congress rather than mere court rules promulgated
62. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 4.2.2(a), at 244.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVI-
DENCE § 501 App.101[1][a] (Mark S. Brodin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2020); Gerald
Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND.
L.J. 845, 881 (1990) (describing the rulemaking process as a “firestorm”).
66. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contempo-
rary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 (1975).
67. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 769 (2002).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 93-52, at 4 (1973).
69. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-46, at 12–13 (1973).
70. Id. at 13–14.
71. Id. at 15–16.
72. Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Crim. Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 7 (1973) (statement of Hon.
Bertram L. Podell).
73. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 4.2.2(a), at 247–48.
74. See id. at 244–45 (“[I]n February 1973, the Senate . . . block[ed] the implementa-
tion of the draft.”); Id. § 4.2.2(f), at 262 (“Public Law 93-595, establishing the Federal
Rules of Evidence, was approved by both houses on January 2, 1975.”).
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by the Supreme Court.75 When the dust settled at the end of the process,
although Congress only amended other draft Articles, Congress com-
pletely jettisoned every provision in the original Article V76 and substi-
tuted a version of the current Rule 501. In pertinent part, Rule 501 reads:
The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light
of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of
the following provides otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute; or
• rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.77
In turn, Rule 101(b)(5) defines “a rule prescribed by the Supreme
Court [as] a rule adopted by the Supreme Court under statutory author-
ity,”78 that is, the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2074. Congress treated
Article V not only in a different substantive fashion than all of the other
Articles but also in a different procedural manner. The final legislation
reserves a limited congressional veto power over most proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Rules; for most articles, an amendment proposed by
the Court will take effect unless Congress takes affirmative action to
block the amendment within 180 days.79 However, Congress prescribed
that privilege amendments may take effect only with Congress’s affirma-
tive approval; the Act flatly states that privilege amendments “shall have
no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.”80 Thus, Congress
retained more control over privilege rules than other evidentiary
doctrines.
Congress chose to exercise that extensive control in 2008 when it en-
acted Rule 502. By 2008, American litigation was well into the era of
“documents cases.” Pretrial discovery had eclipsed trial as the most im-
portant phase of the litigation process; in the new era of “the vanishing
trial” there were relatively few trials,81 and the vast majority of cases
were disposed of without trial on the basis of the developments during
pretrial discovery. In United States v. IBM, the attorneys produced over
75. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 65, § 501 app.101[2].
76. Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Poetry in Motion: The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and Forward Progress as an Imperative, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1894 (2019) (“Con-
gress famously torpedoed the detailed proposed rules of privilege in favor of Rule 501,
leaving privilege to common law development.”).
77. FED. R. EVID. 501.
78. FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(5).
79. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 4.2.2(e).
80. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b); FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“Unlike
all other federal rules of procedure prescribed under the Rules Enabling Act, those rules
governing evidentiary privilege must be approved by an Act of Congress, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074(b).”).
81. Capra & Richter, supra note 76, at 1877 (citing Ad Hoc Comm. on the Future of
the Civ. Trial of the Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, The “Vanishing Trial”: The College, the
Profession, the Civil Justice System, 226 F.R.D. 414, 414 (2005) (the “trial implosion”);
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Fed-
eral and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (“The portion of fed-
eral civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002 . . . .”).
In some states, the figure is as low as 0.6%. Galanter, supra, at 506–08.
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sixty-four million pages of documents in the first five years of pretrial
discovery.82 In another federal case, the Washington Public Power Supply
System Litigation83 (the WPPSS case), involving a default on the bonds
sold to finance a nuclear power plant project, “more than 200 million
pages of documents were produced.”84 Businesses’ reliance on electroni-
cally stored information increased the problem exponentially:
Perhaps no case could be a more monumental example of the real-
ity of modern e-discovery than the . . . copyright infringement lawsuit
against YouTube filed . . . in 2008. In that dispute, the judge ordered
that 12 terabytes of data be turned over, according to Matthew
Knouff.
“People often say that one terabyte equals 50,000 trees, and 10
terabytes would be the equivalent of all the printed collections in the
Library of Congress,” says Knouff, . . . general counsel of Complete
Discovery Source, a New York City-based . . . discovery services pro-
vider. For the Viacom/YouTube case then, the demand was for the
printed equivalent of the entire Library of Congress. And then
some.85
When the magnitude of pretrial production events becomes so massive,
it is virtually inevitable that a producing party will mistakenly disclose
some privileged information. The “time constraints”86 imposed by tight
discovery deadlines and the staggering number of documents make it vir-
tually impossible for the producing party to avoid such inadvertent disclo-
sures—no matter how careful the manual or technology-assisted review
(TAR)87 of the documents being produced. The problem was magnified
because, in the event of inadvertent production, many courts applied two
unreasonably strict waiver rules.
One rule was that no matter how thorough and painstaking the party’s
preproduction privilege review had been, even an inadvertent production
resulted in an automatic waiver of any privilege attaching to the mate-
rial.88 As the Introduction indicated, these courts required the holder to
treat privileges “like jewels—if not crown jewels.”89 The courts applied a
“strict”90 standard, which mandated treating any “uncoerced disclo-
82. Michael A. Pope, Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche, LITIG., Spring 1981, at
28, 28.
83. In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 551, 1988 WL 158947
(W.D. Wash. July 28, 1988).
84. Irwin J. Sugarman, Coordinating Complex Discovery, LITIG., Fall 1988, at 41, 41.
85. Joe Dysart, The Trouble with Terabytes: As Bulging Client Data Heads for the
Cloud, Law Firms Ready for a Storm, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2011, at 32, 32; see also Capra &
Richter, supra note 76, at 1895 (“Eyes-on review of every single electronically stored ter-
abyte became prohibitively expensive, if not impossible.”).
86. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.
87. Id. (referring to “advanced analytical software applications”).
88. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(a)(4), at 1251.
89. Leonard H. Becker, When Advocacy Trumps Confidentiality, LEGAL TIMES, July
17, 2000, at 19 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
90. Jacob P. Hart & Anna Marie Plum, Litigating the Production of Electronic Media,
PRAC. LITIGATOR, July 2001, at 31, 39–40.
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sure”91 as a waiver even when the disclosure was indisputably
inadvertent.92
To make matters worse, many courts then applied a second, unreasona-
bly severe waiver rule, namely that a waiver with respect to one privi-
leged item automatically extends to all other privileged items relevant to
the same subject matter.93 The courts broadly defined the scope of the
waiver.94 The courts found extensive subject matter waivers even when
the relationship between the disclosed information and the other infor-
mation was “tangential”95 or “tenuous.”96 The combined effect of these
two waiver doctrines was that if a holder allowed even a single privileged
document to slip through the preproduction privilege review, there was a
waiver applied to every other privileged document relevant to the same
topic. The predictable result of the concurrent operation of these two
waiver rules was that, before production, litigants felt compelled to spend
ridiculous sums of money on preproduction privilege reviews. As the In-
troduction noted, in one antitrust case Verizon spent almost $14 million
on such a review.97 The potentially enormous cost of such a preproduc-
tion privilege review could easily exceed the monetary stakes in a case.98
In order to avoid incurring that cost, even a litigant with a completely
meritorious claim or defense might conclude that it had no alternative but
to settle.99 Businesses complained to Congress about the problem and
Congress became convinced that unsound, draconian waiver rules were
the root cause.100 The pertinent Senate Judiciary Committee Report
states:
91. Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.,12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 128
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion superseded, 94 P.3d 475 (Cal. 2004).
92. In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
93. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.7(a), at 1327–30. Federal Rule of Evidence
401 codifies a liberal definition of “relevant” evidence. United States v. Causey, 748 F.3d
310, 316 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that the item must merely “in some degree advance the
inquiry” to be relevant (quoting Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 453 (7th Cir.
2006))), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 295 (2018); United States v. Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir.
1993) (“The threshold for relevance is very low under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.”);
United States v. Harry, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1221 (D.N.M. 2014) (“The standard for rele-
vance is liberal.”); see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 184–85 (Robert P. Mosteller ed.,
8th ed. 2020).
94. Jennifer A. Hardgrove, Note, Scope of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: Articu-
lating a Standard That Will Afford Guidance to Courts, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 643, 664–67;
see Meds. Co. v. Mylan Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 894, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“Waiver is broad in
scope . . . .”); VLT, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D. Mass. 2002)
(“[Plaintiff’s actions] operate[d] as a subject matter waiver . . . as to all communications on
the same subject matter.”).
95. Hardgrove, supra note 94, at 667.
96. Id. at 664.
97. Lindsay, supra note 29.
98. Capra & Richter, supra note 76, at 1895 (“The costs of pre-trial discovery
threatened to eclipse the value of a case in some circumstances.”).
99. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (describing the costs as
“prohibitive”).
100. See S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 1–2 (2008), as reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1305,
1305–06.
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The costs of discovery have increased dramatically in recent years as
the proliferation of email and other forms of electronic record-keep-
ing have multiplied the number of documents litigants must review
to protect privileged material. Outdated law affecting inadvertent
disclosure coupled with the stark increase in discovery materials has
led to dramatic litigation cost increases.
Currently, the inadvertent production of even a single privileged
document puts the producing party at significant risk. If a privileged
document is disclosed, a court may find that the waiver applies not
only to that specific document and case but to all other documents
and cases concerning the same subject matter. Furthermore, the priv-
ilege can be waived even if the party took reasonable steps to avoid
disclosing it.
The increased use of email and other electronic media in today’s
business environment have exacerbated the problems with the cur-
rent doctrine on waiver. Electronic information is even more volumi-
nous and dispersed than traditional record-keeping methods, greatly
increasing the time needed to review and separate privileged from
non-privileged material. As the time spent reviewing documents has
increased, so too has the amount of money litigants on all sides must
spend to protect against the potential waiver of privilege.101
As in the case of the original enactment of the Federal Rules, including
Rule 501, Rule 502 took the form of a statute enacted by Congress. Rules
502(a) and (b) are the antidotes to the two unreasonably strict waiver
doctrines that Congress perceived to be the cause of the problem. Again,
one waiver rule was the doctrine that even the most inadvertent produc-
tion of a privileged document automatically forfeited all the privileges
attaching to the document. Rule 502(b) abolishes that rule. It is true that
under Rule 502(b) inadvertent production can sometimes result in a
waiver, but according to the Rule, the inadvertent production of a privi-
leged document does not affect a waiver if: “(2) the holder of the privi-
lege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the
holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error . . . .”102
For its part, Rule 502(a) flatly repudiates the second harsh waiver rule
that even an inadvertent act of production automatically results in a sub-
ject matter waiver. Quite to the contrary, according to Rule 502(a)(1)
only an “intentional” waiver can trigger a subject matter waiver.103 As
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 502(a)(1) explains, “[A]n inadver-
tent disclosure of protected information can never result in a subject mat-
ter waiver.”104 The end result is that Rules 502(a) and(b) reject the strict
waiver rules and replace them with more sensible, practical standards.
101. Id.
102. FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2)–(3).
103. Id. at 502(a)(1).
104. Id. at 502(a) advisory committee’s note.
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B. THE SPECIFIC CONTROVERSY OVER RULE 502(d) SELECTIVE
WAIVER ORDERS
As we have seen, the legislative purpose of Rules 502(a) and (b) in-
cluded the reform of two strict waiver rules. The remaining question is
whether Rule 502(d) should similarly be construed as permitting the re-
form of a third restrictive waiver doctrine, namely the rule forbidding
selective waivers.
At first blush, there seems to be a strong case that the answer to the
question is yes. As parts of the same statute, Rule 502(d) ought to be
construed in the context of Rules 502(a) and (b).105 If both Rules 502(a)
and (b) move the law in the direction of making it harder to find waivers
and easier to uphold prima facie privilege claims, it would certainly be
consistent to interpret Rule 502(d) in the same spirit. For that matter,
construing Rule 502(d) as authorizing selective waiver orders is a less
drastic step than the changes effected by Rule 502(a) and (b); while in
some instances Rule 502(a) and (b) forbid courts from finding a waiver,
upholding Rule 502(d) selective waiver orders has the less dramatic effect
of merely limiting the extent of a waiver.106 Moreover, the text of 502(d)
can bear the interpretation that it allows selective waiver orders; affirma-
tively, the wording is expansive enough to support that interpretation,107
and negatively, 502(d) does not contain any language explicitly prohibit-
ing courts from issuing such orders.
However, when we turn to the legislative history of Rule 502, the pic-
ture becomes muddier. An original draft of Rule 502 included language
expressly authorizing selective waivers.108 The provision would have
stated that there is no waiver if “the disclosure is made to a federal, state,
or local governmental agency during an investigation by that agency, and
is limited to persons involved in the investigation.”109 However, attor-
neys’ groups voiced opposition to the provision. According to Professor
Daniel Capra, the Reporter for the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee, strange bedfellows joined ranks to oppose the provision:
“[D]efense attorneys [did] not like the section on selective waiver be-
cause it eliminate[d] a common excuse for not cooperating with govern-
ment investigators. . . . [T]he plaintiffs’ bar [was] also unhappy with the
provision because it [would] reduce the evidence available for civil litiga-
tion following a government investigation.”110
105. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, “Importing” Restrictions from One Federal
Rule of Evidence Provision to Another: The Limits of Legitimate Contextual Interpretation
in the Age of Statutes, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 231 (2020).
106. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
107. Griffith, supra note 36, at 53–54.
108. Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the
Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211,
247–48, 251 (2006).
109. Id. at 248 (citing FED. R. EVID. 502 (Proposed Draft 2006)).
110. J.P. Finet, Selective Waiver of Privilege Provision Likely to Be Pulled from Pro-
posed Rule of Evidence, LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT, CURRENT REPORTS (ABA/
BLAW) (Feb. 7, 2007).
798 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
In a statement about the proposed Rule, Representative Jackson-Lee
asserted that Rule 502(d) “does not provide a basis for a court to enable
parties to agree to a selective waiver of the privilege, such as to a federal
agency conducting an investigation, while preserving the privilege as
against other parties seeking the information.”111
Although several elements of the legislative history of Rule 502 seem
at odds with the expansive text of Rule 502(d), the final analysis of the
text of Rule 502 and two passages in the legislative history will prove to
be key, as we shall see in Part IV. It is critical to remember that by its
terms, Rule 502 deals only with waivers effected by the holder’s “disclo-
sure” of privileged information. One passage in the Senate Judiciary
Committee report contains the following description of what a judge is
affirmatively authorized to do under Rule 502(d); for example, “[i]f a fed-
eral court enters an order finding that an inadvertent disclosure of privi-
leged information does not constitute a waiver, that order will be
enforceable against [other] persons in federal or state proceedings.”112
Just as significantly, in the second passage Representative Jackson-
Lee’s statement elaborates negatively on what Rule 502(d) does not em-
power the judge to do:
[Rule 502(d)] does not alter the law regarding waiver of privilege
resulting from having acquiesced in the use of otherwise privileged
information. . . .
. . . [A]cquiescence by the disclosing party in use by the federal
agency of information disclosed pursuant to such an order would still
be treated as under current law for purposes of determining whether
the acquiescence in use of the information, as opposed to its mere
disclosure, effects a waiver of the privilege. The same applies to ac-
quiescence in use by another private party.113
Part IV demonstrates that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the text of
Rule 502(d) and those two passages can cohere in a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the controversy over the validity of Rule 502(d) selective waiver
orders.
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF SELECTIVE WAIVER ORDERS UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502(d)
As the Introduction pointed out, the key to resolving the controversy
over the validity of Rule 502(d) selective waiver orders is grasping two
scopes—the limited scope of Rule 502 and the varying scope of the con-
ceivable types of selective waiver agreements.
111. 154 CONG. REC. H7817, 7818–19 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of Rep. Jack-
son-Lee).
112. See S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 3 (2008), as reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1305, at
1307.
113. 154 CONG. REC. H7817, 7818–19.
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We have repeatedly noted that Rule 502 addresses only waivers ef-
fected by the holder’s disclosure. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule
502 explicitly states that “the rule does not purport to supplant applicable
waiver doctrine generally. The rule governs only certain waivers by dis-
closure.”114 Conduct other than disclosure can result in a waiver. For ex-
ample, even if the holder does not make any disclosure, the holder can
waive under the “at issue” doctrine.115 If a plaintiff sues a defendant for
fraud, in his or her answer the defendant might allege that they had an
innocent state of mind because they justifiably relied on “advice of coun-
sel.” At that point, the defendant has not yet disclosed the substantive
content of any of their communications with counsel, but the allegation in
the pleading makes the communications so highly relevant that, as a mat-
ter of fairness, the defendant has waived the privilege.116 Likewise, it is
well-settled that the holder waives the privilege if he or she expressly
consents to the public disclosure of the privileged communication by a
third party.117 The holder need not personally make the disclosure; the
holder’s consent suffices to effect the waiver. Furthermore, there is cer-
tainly a waiver if, although having an opportunity to object, the holder
does not object when a third party attempts to introduce the privileged
information into evidence.118 Here, too, it is irrelevant that the holder
does not personally make any disclosure; the holder implicitly consents to
a third party’s use of the information that would destroy its confidential-
ity. As previously stated, the legislative history of Rule 502 indicates that
it does not govern situations in which, although the holder has not dis-
closed the information, the holder has acquiesced in someone else’s use
of the information in a way that would be at odds with preserving its
confidentiality.119 The solitary type of waiver controlled by Rule 502 is
waiver effected by the holder’s disclosure.120
The other scope to keep in mind is the varying scope of the conceivable
types of selective waiver agreements. As previously stated, the parties
could reach a bare-bones agreement that the holder will disclose to the
other party while simultaneously reserving the right to later assert the
privilege against other parties. In the context of a DPA with the govern-
114. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
115. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(b)(2), at 1214–15.
116. See Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C. v. Borodkin, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1146 (D. Ariz.
2013), aff’d, 798 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2015); see also FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s
note (“Other common-law waiver doctrines may result in a finding of waiver even where
there is no disclosure of privileged information . . . . Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200,
206 (5th Cir. 1999) (reliance on an advice of counsel defense waives the privilege with
respect to attorney-client communications pertinent to that the defense); [B]yers v.
Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 438 (D.D.C. 1983) (allegation of lawyer malpractice constituted
a waiver of confidential communications under the circumstances). The rule is not in-
tended to displace or modify federal common law concerning waiver of privilege or work
product where no disclosure has been made.”).
117. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(a)(5), at 1209–10.
118. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 218 F. Supp. 3d
197, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
119. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
120. See id.
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ment, the holder might hope that having considered the disclosed infor-
mation, the government will either dismiss charges or support a lenient
sentence.
However, the agreement incorporated in the Rule 502(d) order could
have a larger scope. For instance, the agreement might be to the effect
that although the holder intends to retain the privilege as against third
parties, the holder not only agrees to disclose to the government but also
consents to certain public disclosures of the information. The government
might want to publicly disclose the information in order to publicize the
precise type of misconduct it considers illegal and discourage other par-
ties from engaging in such conduct. Finally, theoretically, while purport-
ing to reserve the holder’s privilege rights against other parties, the
agreement might call for the holder to both disclose and consent to the
use of the disclosed information as evidence in a proceeding between the
holder and the government. Again, if the holder were faced with multiple
charges or proceedings, to obtain lenient treatment on other charges or in
other proceedings the holder might plausibly assent to the use of the in-
formation as evidence on a particular charge or in a certain proceeding.
What would be the consequences if a judge incorporated one of these
broader agreements in a Rule 502(d) order? Consider the two types of
selective waiver agreements that could be incorporated into a 502(d) or-
der and, for each type of agreement, two fact situations in which the
holder might rely on the order in later litigation involving third parties.
A. A RULE 502(d) ORDER INCORPORATING A NARROW SELECTIVE
WAIVER AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE HOLDER MERELY
PROMISED TO DISCLOSE PRIVILEGED
INFORMATION
1. Variation #1
As we have seen, one passage in the legislative history of Rule 502(d)
asserts that 502(d) “does not provide a basis for a court to enable parties
to agree to a selective waiver of the privilege, such as to a federal agency
conducting an investigation, while preserving the privilege as against
other parties seeking the information.”121 That assertion is false when it is
applied to a case in which the incorporated selective waiver agreement
contemplates only that the holder will disclose the information to the
government—and then hope that the disclosed information will persuade
the government to treat the holder favorably. Here the scope of the
agreement and the scope of Rule 502 coincide—disclosure simpliciter.
Again, Rule 502(d) reads: “A federal court may order that the privilege
. . . is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending
before the court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any
other federal or state proceeding.”122
121. 154 CONG. REC. H7817, 7818–19 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2008).
122. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
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The passage from the Senate Judiciary Committee report, quoted at the
end of Part III, confirms that that language was intended to mean what it
plainly says.123 In the words of Rule 502(d), the privilege would not be
waived by “disclosure” pursuant to the agreement, and in this variation of
the facts, the holder has not performed or consented to any other act that
could trigger a waiver. If so, the last clause in 502(d) dictates that disclo-
sure pursuant to this limited selective waiver agreement would not affect
“a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.”124 That language
would certainly apply to a subsequent federal or state lawsuit in which a
third party sought to discover the disclosed information. As the Advisory
Committee Note states, “[T]hat order is enforceable against all [other]
persons . . . in any federal or state proceeding.”125 There is nothing in the
text of the Rule or its legislative history to suggest that the expression,
“any other federal or state proceeding,” is restricted to cases involving
the identical parties as the proceeding in which the Rule 502(d) order was
entered. In this variation of the fact situation, an appellate court could
not invalidate a lower court’s Rule 502(d) selective waiver order without
torturing the language of Rule 502(d). Thus, if the holder and the govern-
ment resolve their dispute based on the government’s review of the dis-
closed information, that dispute terminates, and the 502(d) order will
preserve the holder’s privilege in subsequent litigation filed by third
parties.
2. Variation #2
However, suppose that the holder’s initial disclosure does not lead to a
mutually satisfactory resolution of their dispute. The government then
takes the dispute to a trial or enforcement hearing and offers the privi-
leged information as evidence at the trial or hearing. In this variation, by
their terms, neither the agreement between the holder and the govern-
ment nor the order incorporating the agreement applies to the introduc-
tion of the evidence. Both the agreement and the order are limited to the
holder’s disclosure to the government. If at the time of the proffer of the
evidence the holder did not object, the failure to object would affect a
waiver;126 as a party to the trial or hearing, the holder would have the
opportunity to object, and the holder’s neglect to object results in a
waiver. If a waiver occurred at that point, in a later lawsuit against the
holder by private parties, the holder could no longer claim the privilege.
123. See 154 CONG. REC. H7817, 7818–19.
124. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
125. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
126. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, § 6.12.4(c)(6), at 1286.
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B. A RULE 502(d) INCORPORATING A BROADER SELECTIVE WAIVER
AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE HOLDER BOTH PROMISED TO
DISCLOSE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AND TO
PERFORM OR CONSENT TO OTHER ACTS
THAT WOULD EFFECT A WAIVER
Now, suppose that the parties are bolder and draft a broader selective
waiver agreement, which the judge agrees to incorporate into a Rule
502(d) order. In this scenario, the government exacts more than the
holder’s mere promise to disclose privileged information to the govern-
ment. Rather, either because the holder wants to impress the government
with its bona fides or because the government simply has more leverage,
the holder agrees to some public disclosure of the disclosed information,
possibly even the use of the information as trial evidence. Would a Rule
502(d) incorporating that agreement withstand scrutiny and protect the
holder? As in the case of Section IV.A, consider two variations of the fact
situation.
1. Variation #1
Assume that after the parties’ entry into the agreement and a court’s
incorporation of the agreement into a purported 502(d) order, the holder
makes the initial disclosure. However, even after the disclosure, the
holder and government cannot reach a mutually satisfactory outcome.
The government takes the case to trial. At the trial, the government of-
fers some of the privileged information into evidence, and relying on the
terms of the 502(d) order, the holder fails to object—thinking that the
order will enable the holder to assert the privilege in subsequent litigation
filed against the holder by private parties. Will the holder be able to claim
the privilege in the subsequent litigation?
On the one hand, the part of the agreement dealing with only disclo-
sure would be valid. The scope of that part of the agreement and the
scope of Rule 502 again coincide. If the agreement stopped there, the
analysis would be exactly the same as in Variation #1 in Section III.A.
On the other hand, the agreement does not stop there; the terms go
further and include a provision in which the holder consents to some pub-
lic disclosure of the information or, in an extreme variation of the agree-
ment, even the use of the information as evidence. What should be the
analysis in this scenario?
The first step in the analysis is resolving the question of whether, given
its limited scope, Rule 502 can be invoked to uphold the part of the
agreement dealing with acts other than mere production if the agreement
is included in a Rule 502(d) order. The answer is no. That part of the
order is ultra vires and nugatory; Rule 502 deals only with waiver effected
by disclosure. It would be indefensible to strain the text to extend to
other types of waiver; the wording of Rule 502(d) cannot reasonably bear
that construction, and there is nothing in the legislative history of Rule
502 to warrant going so far beyond the text. Rule 502 does not empower
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the judge to validate the portion of the Rule 502(d) order dealing with
acts other than disclosure. Simply stated, that part of the order is invalid
because the court lacks the power to issue the order. Consequently, the
order does not cover the holder’s failure to object to the government’s
use of the information as evidence, and the holder’s failure to object
would again result in a waiver.127 Having neglected to object to the gov-
ernment’s introduction of the evidence, the holder could not later claim
the privilege against private parties in a subsequent lawsuit—the same
result that was obtained in Variation #2 in Section III.A.
2. Variation #2
Alternatively, suppose that after the holder’s disclosure, the holder and
the government reach a mutually satisfactory disposition and that the
government never has occasion to make any public disclosure of the in-
formation. More specifically, suppose that the government never at-
tempts to introduce any of the privileged information into evidence at
any public hearing. At first blush, the holder would seem to have a
stronger case for asserting the privilege in the subsequent lawsuit in this
variation than in the first variation where the government proffered the
evidence at a trial or hearing. Yet, the private litigant who wants to dis-
cover the disclosed information in a subsequent lawsuit has an intriguing
argument.128 When the holder enters into such a broad agreement, there
127. See id.
128. Technically, there is another issue that turns on whether the two parts of the order
can be severed. Suppose that although the order referred to post-disclosure, public use of
the information, the case was disposed of after the disclosure. Having reviewed the dis-
closed information, the government not only gave the holder favorable treatment but also
decided against making any public use of the privileged information. In a subsequent law-
suit by private parties, those parties might contend that because the non-disclosure part of
the agreement was invalid, the entire order was invalid, and that, therefore, even the dis-
closure otherwise covered by Rule 502 effected a waiver. In the analogous situation in
which a court finds that part of a statute is invalid, perhaps as being unconstitutional, the
court engages in a severability analysis. SD Voice v. Noem, 432 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1002
(D.S.D. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-1262 (8th Cir. Feb. 10, 2020). The court usually
begins the severability analysis by inquiring whether the valid part could stand by itself. Id.
Here the answer is yes; the disclosure provision could stand separately, just as it could if it
were the entire scope of a narrow selective waiver agreement. If the valid provision of the
statute could stand on its own two feet, the court then inquires whether the legislature
would have intended the valid portion to take effect without the invalid portion. Id. There
is an unavoidable element of speculation in this phase of the analysis even if the statute
contains a general severability clause. However, in many contexts the courts rely on the
scholastic philosophy concept of interpretative intent: the intent that a person would have
had if he or she had foreseen the problem that materialized. See Edward J. Imwinkelried,
A More Modest Proposal Than a Common Law for the Age of Statutes: Greater Reliance in
Statutory Interpretation on the Concept of Interpretative Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949, 953
(2005). For example, when an unforeseen contingency prevents the performance of a con-
tract, the courts invoke interpretative intent to decide whether to discharge, without any
liability, the party who could not perform his or her duty. In this hypothetical, the court
would probably conclude that the valid disclosure provision is severable from the invalid
provisions dealing with acts other than disclosure. In entering the Rule 502(d) order, the
judge’s basic intent is to facilitate the holder’s dispute with the government. In this hypo-
thetical, after the holder’s disclosure, the parties were able to resolve the dispute. The fact
that the government did not deem it necessary to put the disclosed information to any use
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is a pitfall that to date has gone unidentified. The thrust of the private
litigant’s argument would be that in the agreement, the holder waived the
privilege by merely consenting that the government could use the infor-
mation to make a public disclosure or offer the information into evi-
dence—even if the government never put the information to either of
those uses. This argument well might carry the day. Draft Federal Rule of
Evidence 511 dealt with waiver: “A person upon whom these rules confer
a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or communication
waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege
voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the
matter on communication.”129
The draft Rule refers in the alternative to two ways in which the holder
can waive, that is, either disclosing or consenting to disclosure. California
Evidence Code § 912(a) does likewise:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of any person
to claim a privilege . . . is waived with respect to a communication
protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without co-
ercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has
consented disclosure made by anyone.130
It is easiest for the courts to find consent when the holder grants ex-
press consent,131 as the holder would in the case of a broad selective
waiver agreement incorporated in a Rule 502(d) order. Moreover, it is
critical to bear in mind the lingering judicial hostility to privileges and
their obstructive effect on the search for truth; the courts have gone quite
far in both finding implied consent and declaring waiver even when in
fact there was no subsequent disclosure to someone outside the circle of
confidence. Professors Wright and Graham give the example of a client
depositing privileged communications in a public library; in their view,
“the privilege would be waived, even though no one ever read them.”132
In one case, the court ruled that leaving a notepad containing privileged
information in a prominent place in a public court was inconsistent with a
claim of confidentiality.133 The upshot is that consent to public disclosure
can affect a waiver even before and without actual disclosure. Hence, in
the subsequent lawsuit in Variation #2 the private litigant has an excellent
chance of defeating the holder’s privilege objection on the ground that
that would destroy its confidentiality does not detract from the fact that the intended result
was achieved.
129. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 17, app. A, at 2112 (emphasis added).
130. CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a) (West 2015) (emphasis added).
131. See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 650 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1995). The accused gave the police
detectives consent to speak to his wife about her knowledge of his involvement in a mur-
der. Id. at 21.
132. Goldstein v. Colborne Acquisition Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d 932, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 5507, at 580 n.126 (1986)).
133. United States v. Waller, 581 F.2d 585, 586–87 (6th Cir. 1978); see also KENNETH S.
BROUN, EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES IN FEDERAL COURTS: SURVEY RULES 13 (2014) (dis-
cussing Waller).
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the terms of the broad selective waiver agreement manifested consent to
public disclosure of the information and thereby destroyed the privilege.
A 502(d) order, incorporating a broad agreement, is invalid because Rule
502 is limited to waivers by disclosure. Paradoxically, by seeking more
extensive protection in a broader selective waiver agreement, the holder
could lose even the basic protection that would be afforded by a narrower
502(d) order limited to disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
As Part II noted, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham and the
American Evidence scholar John Henry Wigmore have had a profound
influence on the Anglo-American law of privilege. The former cam-
paigned to abolish most privileges as obstructions to the search for truth,
and the latter urged confining privileges to the narrowest limits possible.
As Professor Liesa Richter, the Academic Consultant to the Federal
Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee, has observed, their influence has
led many American courts to adopt restrictive, absolutist positions on
privilege waivers.134 This Article has touched on a trilogy of such posi-
tions: even an inadvertent production of privileged information results in
a waiver as to that information, a waiver as to any privileged material
automatically effects a subject matter waiver extending to all privileged
information relevant to the same topic, and a holder may not make a
selective waiver. These positions pressure the holder to treat his or her
privilege as a crown jewel135—the protection of the precious jewel re-
quires the holder to refrain from any conduct the least bit inconsistent
with the maintenance of the confidentiality of the information on pain of
waiver.
Federal Rules 502(a) and (b) put an end to the first two restrictive rules
in federal practice. Rules 502(a) and (b) abolished those rigid categorical
rules and replaced them with more flexible standards. Under Rule
502(b), inadvertent production does not have the drastic consequence of
an automatic waiver. If a holder takes reasonable steps to prevent the
production of privileged material and acts promptly to rectify the prob-
lem when the holder subsequently later discovers that there has been an
unintentional production,136 there is no waiver at all. Even if there has
been a waiver as to some privileged information, Rule 502(a) abandons
the harsh view that the waiver automatically applies to every other item
of privileged information relevant to the same subject. There can be a
subject matter waiver but only in exceptional circumstances—situations
in which the production was intentional and the disclosed and undis-
134. Richter, supra note 23, at 129–30.
135. See Becker, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
136. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note (“The rule does not require the
producing party to engage in a post-production review to determine whether any protected
communication or information has been produced by mistake. But the rule does require
the producing party to follow up on any obvious indications that a protected communica-
tion or information has been produced inadvertently.”).
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closed information “ought in fairness to be considered together.”137
The remaining question is the third strict waiver rule: the majority view
prohibiting selective waiver. Just as many courts found waivers based on
inadvertent production and expanded those waivers to the entire subject
matter, most courts have refused to embrace the notion of selective
waiver. Unlike their English counterparts,138 the majority of American
courts still treat the issue as an all-or-nothing proposition: either the
holder asserts the privilege against all persons and entities outside the
magic circle, or the holder waives the privilege in its entirety as to all
strangers to the privileged relationship. Putting aside selective waiver
agreements between private parties, the proponents of selective waiver
contend that, at least in the context of government investigations into
corporate misconduct, selective waiver agreements can serve a useful
public purpose. If the agreement incorporated into a Rule 502(d) order
removes the corporation’s fear that disclosure to the government will ex-
pose the corporation to extensive monetary liability in subsequent private
litigation, the agreement can encourage corporate cooperation with gov-
ernment investigators, conserve the investigators’ limited resources, and
increase the probability that the real malefactors—the natural persons
who acted on behalf of the corporation—will be punished. When the cor-
poration is facing modest criminal punishment but the misconduct could
potentially expose the entity to substantial civil liability in later litigation,
absent a Rule 502(d) order the corporation might very well refuse to co-
operate with the government. As we have seen, the original draft would
have expressly authorized Rule 502 orders incorporating selective waiver
agreements, but attorney groups successfully lobbied to have that lan-
guage deleted from the final version of Rule 502. Today, some opponents
of selective waiver point to the passage in the extrinsic legislative history
material avowing an intention that Rule 502(d) orders may not incorpo-
rate a selective waiver agreement.
As this brief Article has hopefully demonstrated, the weakness of the
opponents’ argument is that the argument overlooks two crucial scope
issues: the scope of Rule 502 and the varying scope of the different con-
ceivable types of selective waiver agreements. Rule 502 regulates waivers
effected by disclosure. If a 502(d) order incorporates a narrow selective
waiver agreement limited to disclosure, the enforcement of the agree-
ment is entirely consistent with the text of the Rule. The holder, though,
can overreach by asking the court to incorporate a broad selective waiver
agreement purportedly protecting the holder against waivers effected by
137. Thus, it is not enough that the disclosed and undisclosed information relate to the
same topic. Under Rule 502(a)(1), the disclosure must be intentional, and Rule 502(a)(3)
imposes the further limitation that “they ought in fairness to be considered together.” FED.
R. EVID. 502(a)(1), (3). As the Advisory Committee Note points out, the wording of Rule
502(a)(3) echoes the fairness standard codified in the federal version of the rule of com-
pleteness, Federal Rule 106. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 93, § 32.
138. See Belhaj v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions [2018] EWHC (Admin) 513 [2] (Eng.); Citic
Pac. Ltd. v. Sec’y for Just., [2012] 4 H.K.C. 1, 15; Berezovsky v. Hine [2011] EWHC (Civ)
1089, [28]–[29] (Eng.); see also supra text accompanying note 51.
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other conduct such as publication of the privileged information or even
the use of the information as trial evidence. Courts cannot look to Rule
502 as a source of authority to uphold orders of that breadth; those orders
exceed Rule 502’s modest scope, applying only to waivers effected by dis-
closure. Part IV demonstrated that if the holder overreaches by asking a
court to enforce such an agreement, the holder’s efforts may be worse
than ineffective; the efforts may prove to be counterproductive in the
sense that they waive the privilege for even the disclosed information by
manifesting consent to acts other than production, which triggers waiver.
Rules 502(a) and (b) go a long way toward meaningful reform of the
federal law of privilege waiver. They repudiate the first two rules in the
trilogy of restrictive waiver doctrines and replace them with practical,
sensible standards. Rule 502(d) should be construed as modifying the
third rule in the trilogy and permitting the holder to assert the privilege
against third parties only in a circumscribed fact situation: the order in-
corporates a narrow selective waiver agreement limited to the holder’s
initial disclosure, and the holder neither performs nor consents to any
other act that could affect a waiver. Even in that situation a judge surely
should not feel compelled to routinely incorporate selective waiver agree-
ments between private parties in Rule 502(d) orders, but the judge ought
to have discretion to do so when the holder’s agreement with a govern-
ment enforcement or regulatory agency will serve the important public
policy of facilitating an investigation into serious misconduct by an en-
tity’s natural person agents.139 The upshot is that, in some respects, the
third restrictive doctrine in the trilogy will survive.
The bottom line is that Rules 502(a), (b), and (d) all represent note-
worthy, sound reforms. As previously stated, pretrial discovery has be-
come the “center of gravity” in modern litigation.140 These three
provisions embody reforms that directly impact the pretrial discovery
stage. Professor Richter has referred to the gradual “evolution of privi-
lege doctrine from a paradigm of rigid absolutism to one of fairness and
flexible party autonomy over protected information.”141 These provisions
are significant steps in that evolutionary process. As a result of the re-
forms they have wrought, in federal practice, holders no longer have to
treat their privileges like delicate crown jewels; a minor, innocent misstep
will no longer be fatal to the holder’s privilege rights. Nevertheless, hold-
ers must exercise their privilege rights in a careful, discriminating man-
ner. In particular, in the case of Rule 502(d), the holder must pay special
attention to the dangerous pitfall that can arise when Rule 502(d)’s nar-
139. Enron Corp. v. Borget, No. 88 CIV. 2828, 1990 WL 144879, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
22, 1990) (“[T]he public policy concern of encouraging cooperation with law enforcement
militates in favor of a no waiver finding.”).
140. John W. Cooley, Puncturing Three Myths about Litigation, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984, at
75, 76. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need for Truly Systemic Analysis of
Proposals for the Reform of Both Pretrial Practice and Evidentiary Rules: The Role of the
Law of Unintended Consequences in “Litigation” Reform, 32 REV. LITIG. 201, 235–36
(2013).
141. Richter, supra note 23, at 129–30.
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row scope, limited to disclosure, is applied to a selective waiver agree-
ment with broader scope. The consequences of an overreaching Rule
502(d) could be catastrophic.
